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1. Introduction
The EU poses national political parties with a fundamen-
tal challenge, as it simultaneously issues significant con-
straints on the policy freedom of national legislators and
presents parties with a political arena that goes beyond
the boundaries of the familiar nation-state (Blomgren,
2003; Hix, 2008). The EU thus “confronts domestic politi-
cal parties with a new structure of threats and opportuni-
ties” (Hix& Lord, 1997, p. 5), as they now “act outside the
nation-state in ways that they have never done before”
(Blomgren, 2003, p. 2). Indeed, “the EU, long character-
ized as a system of multilevel governance, is moving to a
system of multilevel and perhaps transnational politics”
(Laffan, 2016, p. 922; see also Braun, Gross, & Rittberger,
2020). However, parties have shown to be rather un-
moved by these events: They have not fundamentally al-
tered the way they organise in response to this chang-
ing environment (Poguntke, Aylott, Carter, Ladrech, &
Luther, 2007).
Even so, while European integration might not have
been a major instigator of organisational change, it nev-
ertheless generated a level of governance on which a
number of actors are active: Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs),ministers, commissioners and several
presidents—all of which “are predominantly recruited
from political parties” (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 1). Moreover,
Europarties and the European Parliament (EP) groups are
increasingly taking centre stage in the development of a
genuine EU party system (Lefkofridi & Katsanidou, 2018),
which also demands specific attention from national par-
ties. More fundamentally, just as in the national arena,
political parties also “embody the link between citizenry
and EU institutions” (Lefkofridi, 2020). The main ques-
tion this article thus aims to answer is: How do parties
structure their contacts with the European level, and
what explains differences between parties?
Building on the concept of vertical integration, this
article aims to identify parties’ organisational strategies
and offers a rational choice institutionalist explanation
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for why parties opt for certain strategies. Applying this
framework to the Flemish parties, the article shows that,
while electoral gain is an important incentive for par-
ties, functional goal-seeking cannot fully explain parties’
approach to multilevel interactions. Rather, parties also
take into account historical and normative considera-
tions in their cost-benefit equation. Moreover, the qual-
itative analysis makes clear that parties treat the EU
primarily as a political issue, rather than as a genuine
polity—which has significant implications for the demo-
cratic nature of the EU. These results highlight the impor-
tance of EU politicisation in the domestic arena, simulta-
neously showing that norms and traditions can overrule
functional imperatives. The article therefore concludes
by calling for more comparative research to address the
concrete nature of parties’ multilevel interactions.
2. The Vertical Integration of Political Parties
In their seminal study of the Europeanisation of national
party organisation, Poguntke et al. (2007) have shown
that parties adapt little to the existence of the EU. Ladrech
(2007) went so far as to claim that national parties are
in fact “missing in action” when it comes to European af-
fairs. The Europeanisation literature, however, looks at a
rather specific element of party organisation: the internal
balance of power. It considers to what extent European
integration has altered the accountability of party lead-
ers and the influence of “EU specialists” on party de-
cisions, (unsurprisingly) concluding that the EU has in
fact not altered the fundamental organisational struc-
tures of national parties in any significant way (Carter,
Luther, & Poguntke, 2007). Alternatively, while studies of
the relationship between parties and MEPs have shown
that parties hardly try to control their EU-level agents
(Hix, 2002; Mühlböck, 2012; Raunio, 2000), recent re-
search has highlighted strong indications that there are
frequent contacts between national parties and their peo-
ple at the European level (Jensen, Proksch, & Slapin, 2013;
Senninger, 2017; Senninger & Bischof, 2017). They have
not, however, delved into the concrete nature of these
contacts. Indeed, they “do not provide an analysis of the
fine-grained coordination mechanisms that shape policy
issue transfer” (Senninger & Bischof, 2017, p. 158).
This article does not aim to re-do those excellent
studies. Rather, it aims to take off where these studies
explicitly say they ended: studying the concrete nature
and structure of the contacts between the national party
and the European level. To study this multilevel organisa-
tion of political parties, the article turns to federal schol-
ars in the tradition of Deschouwer (2003), Fabre (2011),
Thorlakson (2011), and Detterbeck (2012), who address
the relationship between party organisations at different
levels. They show how contextual and party-specific fac-
tors combine to define parties’ multilevel organisation.
Accordingly, this article uses the concept of vertical inte-
gration to describe and measure the cross-level interac-
tions of political parties.
Vertical integration is understood varyingly through-
out the literature as the “linking of activities and strate-
gies at…different levels” (Deschouwer, 2006, p. 299), as
“formal and informal linkages in organisation, person-
nel, finances and political programmes” (Detterbeck &
Hepburn, 2010, p. 24), and as “the extent of organ-
isational linkages, interdependence and cooperation”
(Thorlakson, 2009, p. 161). Although emphases differ,
they all convey the existence of a “common governance
structure” between levels within a party (Thorlakson,
2009). This article thus aims to capture the common
governance structures between the national and the
European level within a party, focussing on both formal
decision-making and informal coordination. These struc-
tures can be either weak or strong. Having ‘weak’ struc-
tures means that contacts are limited in quantity, but
also that interactions are informal, ad hoc, and on the
personal level. Having ‘strong’ structures, by contrast,
means that contacts occur more frequently, and that in-
teractions are formal, regular, and organised.
At the national level, one can arguable divide a party
into the party organisation, the parliamentary group,
and, when in government, the party in executive office.
While a party’s ministers are active simultaneously in the
national government and in the EU’s Councils, the dis-
tinction between a party organisation and parliamentary
group has more or less been mimicked at the European
level: the Europarties and EP delegations. While EP dele-
gations perform a similar function to national parliamen-
tary groups, the Europarties are important platforms for
parties to coordinate at the European level beyond the
legislative work in the EP. However, some of these are
more ‘of the party’ than others. MEPs, for example, are
officialmembers of the national party and are competing
in European (but nationally organised) elections where
they represent their national party. The Europarty, by
contrast, is a federation of national parties: its officials
are not necessarily directly linked to the national party. It
nonetheless offers its member parties a forum to debate
European election strategies, develop a common mani-
festo, prepare for European Councils and even put for-
ward their own Spitzenkandidat. Therefore, this article
argues that national parties’ multilevel interactions are
structured along two dimensions: internal and external.
The internal dimension involves those actors who
are formally part of the national party: MEPs, ministers,
European Commissioners, party staff and EU experts—
parties’ “EU specialists” (Poguntke et al., 2007, p. 12).
Vertical integration on the internal dimension is the ex-
tent to which there exist common governance structures
with these EU specialists. Are they integrated in the func-
tioning of the national party, or do they work in isola-
tion from the rest of the party? MEPs’ active participa-
tion in national group meetings and party boards, for ex-
ample, can be considered an indication of ‘strong’ com-
mon structures. The external dimension involves those
actors that form the European transnational partisan net-
work in which national parties are active—given shape
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through the Europarty. Vertical integration on the ex-
ternal dimension is the extent to which national par-
ties are invested in the Europarty and broader network.
Are national parties active and committed members of
such a network, or do they go at it alone? For exam-
ple, proactive preparation of and senior participation in
a Europarty congress can be considered an indication of
‘strong’ common structures.
Four types of multilevel organisation can be identi-
fied (Figure 1). ‘Federated’ parties have strong external
common structures, but weak internal ones. They are ac-
tive in their European network, but keep the European
level rather isolated from the rest of the parties’ ac-
tivities. ‘Stratified’ parties have weak common struc-
tures both internally and externally. Their national and
European activities are separated, nor do they signifi-
cantly invest in a European network. ‘Integrated’ parties
have strong common structures both externally and in-
ternally. They aim for an extensive integration of the EU
in their own party structure, as well as for far-reaching
cooperation in a broader EU network. ‘Unified’ parties, fi-
nally, have strong internal common structures, but weak
external ones. They aim to keep their own party organ-
isation as unified as possible, limiting coordination cost
across levels.
One characteristic of the qualitative measurement
of these indicators is that there is room for interpreta-
tion on behalf of the researcher. The common gover-
nance structures parties develop, both on the internal
and external dimensions, may indeed vary from weak
to strong. However, this distinction is not a strict di-
chotomy. Between ‘weak’ (informal, ad hoc, personal)
and ‘strong’ (formal, regular, organised) structures, dif-
ferent concrete situations are possible that combine
weak and strong features. For example, one could imag-
ine a situation where MEPs are not actively involved in
decision-making within the party (‘weak’ structure), but
are presented with and follow compulsory vote instruc-
tions by the national party leadership (‘strong’ structure).
In such a case it would be up to the researcher to make
a judgement, based on the overall information available
about that party, whether the structures are deemed
‘weak’ or ‘strong’—and consequently which type of or-
ganisation the party is considered to have. Although
the author of course maximised the objectivity of the
research, a certain degree of interpretation is thus in-
evitable (see also Aylott, Blomgren, & Bergman, 2013).
3. Explaining Variation
To address the question which of these organisational
strategies parties are likely to pursue, one must keep
in mind that ‘weak’ structures are the default situation
on which parties can fall back. The question then be-
comes: Why would parties decide to invest in more than
the default situation? This article turns to rational choice
institutionalism to provide an explanatory framework.
Parties have limited resources and whether or not they
invest in common governance structures is thus a cost-
benefit issue. The costs involve building these structures,
while the benefits involve reaching party goals—votes,
office, policy, and internal cohesion (Harmel & Janda,
1994; Hellström & Blomgren, 2016; Müller & Strøm,
1999). Does building these structures help parties reach
their goals? As such, parties are rational goal-seekers,
who strive to make the most cost-effective decisions
based on their own attributes and the institutional con-
text that presents itself. Both these aspects will need to
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Figure 1. Typology of multilevel party organisation in an EU context.
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be taken into account in order to get a full picture of
both the costs and benefits involved (Lowndes&Roberts,
2013; Peters, 2005).
3.1. The EU Context
Generally, the EU’s multilevel system increases the costs
of investing in common governance structures, while
the benefits gained are far from obvious. Although the
European level is increasingly more important in terms
of policy-making, politically it is a distant entity. The EU
is often considered to have its own political dynamic that
is often not reported on in national media. Additionally,
the complexity of EU legislation and decision-making—
with its many checks, compromises, and technicalities—
increases the mental distance with ‘Brussels’ (Poguntke
et al., 2007). Bridging this wide gap requires signifi-
cant investment.
At the same time, the benefits that can possibly be
incurred are not very clear. For one, it is far from certain
that multilevel coordination will result in more votes or
prestigious offices. The salience of EU policies in the do-
mestic political arena is generally rather low: European
elections are still second-order to national elections,
meaning that whatever EU-level actors do will have lit-
tle impact on the domestic electoral fortunes of their
national parties (Cabeza, 2018; Hoeglinger, 2015; Mair,
2007; Marsh, 1998; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Additionally,
it is difficult for individual parties to directly influence EU
policy-making. They often only have a limited number of
MEPs,while Commissioners are supposed to be apolitical
and ministers in the Council need negotiating autonomy
(Carter & Poguntke, 2010). Also, in terms of office the
EU is unattractive, as majority parties cannot divide pres-
tigious offices amongst themselves as they usually can
in the national context. Not unimportantly, the EU can
also be a highly divisive issue both within a party and the
broader society (Green-Pedersen, 2012; Kriesi, 2016). All
in all, the benefits of investing in vertical integration are
thus far from obvious.
3.2. Party Characteristics
Although it is important to keep this context in mind,
it applies to virtually all national parties in the EU and
thus in itself cannot explain variation between parties
within the same political system. One should therefore
also consider party-specific characteristics. To explain dif-
ferences between the Flemish parties, this article takes
into account two fundamental variables: their govern-
ment/opposition status, and the Europarty of which they
are a member. While aware that there are other vari-
ables that could possibly have an influence, for the
Flemish case these two are considered to be the most
relevant in terms of parties’ rational goal-seeking be-
haviour. For example, although internal dissent over the
EU could be an important reason for parties to (not) in-
vest in interactionwith the European level, dissentwithin
the Flemish parties under study is so low that it is not
taken into account for explaining variation.
First, keeping in mind that there was no asymmetry
in Flemish/federal government composition during the
data gathering period, opposition parties have less incen-
tives to invest in internal common governance structures
than governing parties. One can reasonably assume that
most opposition parties aim at winning elections (vote-
seeking). Given the low salience of EU affairs in Flanders,
this is a goal they are unlikely to achieve by investing
in multilevel coordination. Additionally, Flemish oppo-
sition parties have only one MEP, meaning that their
chances of directly influencing major EU legislation are
slim. Granted, as argued by several authors (for example,
see Senninger, 2017), opposition parties might use their
MEPs to gain information about EU legislation and as
such reduce the information asymmetry with governing
parties. However, keeping in mind that ‘weak’ structures
are parties’ default, it would seem unlikely that opposi-
tion parties would be swayed to invest their limited re-
sources in multilevel coordination only to (sporadically)
gain information that they might just as well gain from
informal contacts. All in all, opposition parties thus have
little to gain from that investment.
Governing parties, by contrast, take aim not only at
votes but also at policies—a goal for which they need
to spend time and energy on the EU (if only to trans-
pose EU directives). Moreover, there are more people
involved (often more MEPs, but also ministers and per-
haps a Commissioner), whichmeans that ad hoc and per-
sonal contacts might not suffice to keep everyone up to
date. Additionally, governing parties are also more sen-
sitive to the risks of discordance between the position
they take at different levels and in different institutions.
As argued by several authors over the past decades,
a cohesive parliamentary group is crucial in Western
party government—without it, governments and govern-
ing coalitions would be unable to govern (Bowler, Farrell,
& Katz, 1999). The importance of party cohesion for gov-
erning parties also shows in the many pressures on ma-
jority Members of Parliament (MPs) to vote in line with
the government. Although this pressure somewhat di-
minisheswhen crossing over to the European level,much
like MPs also MEPs are expected to support their minis-
ters (or at least not embarrass their minister by explicitly
voting divergently). This “dictate” of party government is
absent for opposition parties (Epstein, 1980). That is not
to say that opposition parties are not at all concerned
about party cohesion, but rather in a less pressing way
than governing parties are.
H1: Governing parties will invest more in the inter-
nal dimension of vertical integration than opposition
parties.
Second, parties of established transnational networks
have more incentives to invest in external structures.
European partisan networks are increasingly taking cen-
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tre stage, with particularly the Europarties trying to
serve as coordinating structures—much like the cen-
tral offices of national parties (Crum & Fossum, 2009;
Hix & Lord, 1997; Lefkofridi & Katsanidou, 2018). The
Europarties, among other things, support their mem-
ber parties with preparing the European elections,
write common manifestos, organise meetings to dis-
cuss electoral strategies, provide a forum to prepare
European Councils, and, more recently, decide on the
Spitzenkandidaten. However, the degree of institutional-
isation of these networks differs greatly. The traditional
party families (Christian-democrat, socialist, and liberal)
have a more institutionalised network with established
decision-making procedures and structures, which can
significantly reduce the costs of navigating the EU for na-
tional parties, while possibly increasing policy influence
and office rewards. By contrast, a disorganised network
cannot ensure its people are put in top jobs, nor can it
weigh on EU decision-making in a coordinated way. For
example, a Christian-democratic party can significantly
punch above its weight in terms of defining European
policies if it is actively involved in the EPP. Much more so
than, for example, a green party, given the difference in
clout between the EPP and the EGP. As such, in terms of
rational goal-seeking behaviour, it makes more sense for
a Christian-democratic party to invest in such a network
than it would for a green party, given the differences in
the return on investment for both parties.
Of course, parties will havemore difficulty seeing the
added value of a partisan network if there is low congru-
ence between their positions and those of the Europarty.
Even from a rational choice perspective, there is little to
gain from being an active member of a network if that
network strives towards policy goals you disagree with.
Recent research has shown, however, that on the domi-
nant left–right dimension this congruence is quite high
for the ‘traditional’ parties, while somewhat lower for
the ‘new’ parties, such as the EGP and the ECR (Lefkofridi
& Katsanidou, 2014). This thus reinforces the expectation
that members of established networks have more incen-
tives to invest in external structures.
H2: Parties of established Europarties will invest more
in the external dimension of vertical integration than
parties of new Europarties.
4. Method and Data
This article assesses the multilevel organisation of na-
tional political parties by analysing how they interact
with the EU level. In line with the typology outlined
above, it measures the vertical integration of parties by
looking at internal and external common governance
structure. The focus is on ‘formal’ decision-making pro-
cedures and ‘informal’ coordination regarding policy po-
sitions. While formal procedures are usually put down
in statutes, informal processes are more difficult to cap-
ture. For that reason, the article adopts a strongly qual-
itative approach, relying heavily on semi-structured in-
depth interviews with party elites. 20 interviews have
been conducted in total with five of the main Flemish
parties (Table 1), with respondents selected in such away
as to ensure a diversity of perspectives. The radical right
Vlaams Belang, although an interesting case, was not in-
cluded in this study because the party declined to partici-
pate in the interviews for data gathering. Because nearly
all respondents requested anonymity, citations will be
referenced as ‘personal communication’.
This article explains variation by looking at two vari-
ables on the party level—the Europarty of which the
party is a member and whether it is in government or
opposition. For that reason, it will focus on parties in
one particular environment: Flanders. This narrow focus
allows us to control for domestic contextual variables,
while maintaining sufficient variation between parties.
Belgium’s largest region of Flanders was selected as a
most-likely case, as many of the factors that make the
costs of investment so high are mitigated in the Flemish
context. For one, with Brussels as its capital, Flanders can
be found at the core of the EU, both in terms of policy-
making and geography. It greatly depends on policy-
making by the EU institutions, while the proximity of the
EU institutions minimises the physical distance from the
parties’ central offices. Additionally, Belgium is a feder-
ated country with a highly complex institutional system.
As such, Flemish politicians are accustomed to the com-
plex situations and many compromises that EU decision-
making requires. It is not a distant and complex system,
but rather familiar and nearby. In fact, the only existing
hurdle for Flemish parties to invest in coordination with
their European agents is the total lack of politicisation
of the EU issue in Flanders. With an average of 4.3 on a
Table 1. Flemish political parties.
Party Europarty EP Group Party Family Status
CD&V EPP EPP Christian-Democrat Government
N-VA EFA ECR Conservative/regionalist Government*
OVLD ALDE ALDE* Liberal Government
sp.a PES S&D Social-Democrat Opposition
Groen EGP Greens-EFA Green Opposition
Notes: * This article builds on data from 2018, before the Flemish nationalists left the Belgian federal government (December 2018) and
before ALDE was reformed into Renew Europe (June 2019).
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scale of 0 to 10, the salience of the EU issue in Flanders is
significantly below the EU average of 6 (Polk et al., 2017).
This situation allows us to isolate politicisation as a do-
mestic contextual factor, which makes Flanders a rather
suitable case to study the topic at hand.
Two additional characteristics of the Flemish parties
need to be highlighted. First, the Flemish parties are not
typical regional parties, nor are they regional branches of
national ‘Belgian’ parties. For example, there are Flemish
socialists and Walloon socialists, but no Belgian social-
ists. Moreover, Flemish parties have a clear federal out-
look, as the national elections are first order. Second,
Belgium is a prime example of a partitocracy (Dewachter,
2014). Political life and the intra-party power-balance is
dominated by the party in central office. Particularly the
party president provides overall leadership—responding
to political crises, deciding on urgent party lines, main-
taining party discipline, etc. (Dewachter, 2005). The cen-
tral party leadership of Flemish parties thus tends to be
highly involved in the internal coordination of the party
and its mandatories.
5. Case Study: The Flemish Parties
Most Flemish party statutes go little beyond mentioning
that their EP delegation is somehow represented in the
party board. Moreover, not a single statute defines the
relation with the Europarty—some do not even mention
it at all. It is clear, then, that statutes are nowhere near
a proper benchmark for parties’ multilevel organisation
vis-à-vis the EU. Based on interviews, however, Figure 2
shows that there is quite some variation. The remainder
of this section will go deeper into this variation, address-
ing first the internal and then the external dimension of
parties’ vertical integration.
5.1. Internal Dimension
Overall, Flemish parties invest rather little in ‘internal’
vertical integration due to the overall electoral irrele-
vance of the EU: “Europe is the end of the line; first there
are Flemish and federal issues, then EU issues…only
when things become very, very acute is there a big discus-
sion, for example on Brexit—but that is very rare” (per-
sonal communication). Indeed, far from a systematic in-
teractionwith their actors at the European level, national
parties only invest in keeping upwith the discussions and
decisions at the European level when these are relevant
in the domestic arena. Electoral gains thus generally out-
weigh other incentives when it comes to investing in in-
ternal coordination.
Nonetheless, there is variation between parties.
Particularly the Flemish nationalists and Christian-
democrats invest notably more in internal coordination.
The Christian-democrats have over the years created an
extensive system of coordination on European affairs
that involves a wide range of actors: the party leader-
ship, M(E)Ps, ministerial advisors, policy experts, and
regular party members. The main spill of coordination
is their internal working group on the EU. Whereas the
leadership only gets actively involved on short-term high-
salience issues, the working group serves as a forum
to discuss the party’s position on European issues and
takes the lead in preparing the party’s manifesto for the
European elections.
The Flemish nationalists’ leadership is more directly
involved. N-VA developed strong coordination mecha-
nisms, with formal structures supplemented by exten-
sive informal exchanges. The party executive gathers
information from all its parliamentary groups (includ-
ing the EP delegation) through regular written reports,
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Figure 2. Flemish parties’ vertical integration.
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also keeping track of what its ministers are doing in the
Council. Particularly the party’s ‘daily management’—
a smaller group including the party president, vice-
president, secretary, and spokesperson—wants to be
continuously aware of all the ins and outs at all levels,
with an eye on being able to make swift informed deci-
sions when an issue pops up.
Both parties highlight the importance of internal co-
ordination for being able to effectively pursue their pre-
ferred policies. As one respondent explained: “We work
together very closely andwe try to streamline asmuch as
possible, in order to have an impact as strong and direct
as possible” (personal communication). The Christian-
democrats are Belgium’s governing party par excellence,
having been in nearly every government for the past five
decades, and as such build on a long tradition of paying
attention to the European dimension—it would be “un-
thinkable not to put the EU on the agenda” (personal
communication).
The Flemish nationalists additionally stress that their
ascension into federal government was the main cat-
alysts for building these internal structures. The fact
that they got into federal government means that their
ministers actively participated in EU decision-making,
which required the party leadership to keep a finger
on the European pulse, which in turn was facilitated by
the increased number of MEPs they have. It is up to
the leadership to ensure that all these noses are point-
ing in the same direction: “Every vote can potentially
cause trouble, as once you voted on something you can
be attacked on it. So you want to be sure” (personal
communication).
By contrast, the liberals—the third party in Flemish
government—have few formalised structures and rely on
informal, personal interaction to provide coordination:
“We do not really have an organised structure for [mul-
tilevel coordination]. Of course that can happen ad hoc,
and it is more amatter of a reflex that needs to exist with
all people involved” (personal communication). The lib-
erals do not see the point of investing in internal coordi-
nation. They are highly united in their EU position, which
“means that there will be few accidents in the EP dele-
gation and MEPs will stay within the limits of the liberal
river, so to speak—no flood” (personal communication).
Their internal cohesion thus obliterates any incentives
they might have to invest in internal coordination.
Also, the greens and socialists invest fairly little in
common governance structures with their internal ac-
tors. Both parties delegatemost European issues to their
EU specialists, with little involvement of those who are
not directly involved. Only on the most relevant topics
does the party leadership intervene. The reason they put
forward is very clear: their MEPs can hardly offer any-
thing that can help the party win elections, and winning
elections is the main goal of opposition parties:
The EP delegation works a bit in a bubble, but it is
also true that the party does not invest a great deal in
trying to break that bubble. The party has limited re-
sources and a limited number of people and manda-
tories at its disposal, so it directs those resources to
those issues that are politically useful—and prefer-
ably immediately so—to the detriment of EU issues
which usually aren’t. (personal communication)
Moreover, for both parties the EU issue is rather divisive.
Although they are pro-EU generally, they have serious
reservations about the policy direction in which the EU
is heading. As such, neither leadership is jumping for joy
to put the EU on the internal agenda.
Overall, functional goal-seeking, and particularly do-
mestic vote-seeking, is the main driver for (the lack of)
investment in the internal dimension of vertical integra-
tion. As such, government participation matters in the
sense that not participating demolishes any investment
incentives a party may have had. It simply does not pay
off. However, once in government the image becomes
more nuanced. Respondents have confirmed that gov-
ernment participation significantly increases the incen-
tives to invest in coordination, both due to the policy
opportunities and dissension risks. Yet, these incentives
are mediated by other factors such as leadership style
(N-VA), previous investments (CD&V), and internal cohe-
sion (OVLD).While government participation thus seems
to be a dependable overall predictor, it needs to be con-
sidered jointly with other party-specific factors.
5.2. External Dimension
With the notable exception of the Flemish nationalists,
Flemish parties invest a significant amount of time and
energy in the external dimension of vertical integra-
tion, i.e., cooperation and coordination with their re-
spective Europarties and sister parties. The main incen-
tives Flemish parties have to invest in them are the ex-
pected return in terms of office and policy. The Christian-
democrats, for example, spend appreciable resources on
interactionwith the EPP. Andwith good reason: Investing
in the EPP allows CD&V to “weigh on the course of the
EPP andmore broadly the EU far beyond what can other-
wise be expected from essentially a rather small party”
(personal communication). For one, EPP membership
brought otherwise unattainable offices to key CD&V fig-
ures such as Dehaene, Martens, and Van Rompuy.
Similarly, the Flemish greens invest a great deal in the
EGP, because the party believes the EGP “is the best way
to communicate the greenmessage in Europe” (personal
communication). This is rather striking, however, given
the fact that the EGP is nowhere near the level of insti-
tutionalisation of the EPP. As such, there is no immedi-
ate return on investment for Groen, as the EGP cannot
offer them much high-ranking offices, nor does it have
the organisational capacity to significantly weigh on EU
policies. Groen’s choice is thus both an ideological choice
(‘we are strongly pro-EU and thus want to see a strong
EGP’), and a long-term rational investment (‘one day a
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strong EGP will yield the same returns as they see the
EPP yielding today’).
Also, the socialist and liberal parties invest consid-
erably in respectively the PES and ALDE, yet they have
mixed feelings about the return on their investment.
They are active members of their Europarties because
they expect those Europarties to take the lead on a
number of policy areas that outgrew the national level,
e.g., climate change or the eurozone. And while both
Europarties are quite vested and have more or less ro-
bust internal procedures, the Flemish socialists and lib-
erals are frustrated about the lack of leadership and co-
herence their Europarties deliver. The PES is considered
“a real disaster…nothing but the sum of national parties”
(personal communication), while the initiatives taken by
ALDE are deemed “interesting, but of little use” (per-
sonal communication).
One of the main reasons why they still invest in their
Europarties is that the costs to do so are very small
compared to the (reportedly limited) benefits—for ex-
ample, a photo-op with a French president during cam-
paigning. Additionally, both parties also stress their lead-
erships’ commitment to building transnational alliances,
even though these do not seem to yield significant imme-
diate gains. It is a matter of making a relatively small, but
long-term investment that holds the possibility of high
gains at a later stage, both in terms of office (e.g., Guy
Verhofstadt) and policy.
The Flemish nationalists do notmake this investment.
Their comprehensive internal coordination is in stark con-
trast with the thrift with which they invest in external co-
ordination. They pride themselves on not being coerced
into positions by either the EFA party or the ECR group.
Indeed, while the EFA is a weak Europarty that has little if
anything to offer or demand, their choice for the ECRwas
both deliberate and imposed. Given how they felt they
did not ideologically fit any of the existing groups, they
purposely “chose for the ECR group because we were
given the guarantee that we could pursue our own po-
sitions and not be forced by group pressure to go in one
direction or another” (personal communication).
Their choice for the ECR that can thus be seen as
a way of ensuring they are not forced into a straight-
jacket that is too far off from their own position, but also
as an insurance policy: they would get the benefits of
being part of the third-largest EP group (e.g., in terms
of offices and speaking time) without the obligation to
agree upon sensitive issues with much more radical par-
ties like the Polish PiS or the Sweden Democrats. As such,
the N-VA is a good example of how various goals inter-
twine, but simultaneously of how a party’s prime con-
cern is its position in the domestic arena rather than the
European arena.
Overall, however, the Flemish parties spend no small
part of their resources on their Europarties and main-
taining transnational partisan networks. The main goal
of this investment is to increase their (policy) influence
in EU decision-making—and, perhaps on the side, to ob-
tain some prestigious offices—by using the Europarty
as a leverage. The Flemish parties are very well aware
of their relative smallness in the European context: “All
of us [Flemish MEPs] together is about half the num-
ber of MEPs the CDU has” (personal communication).
Therefore, parties try to compensate this lack of direct
influence by investing in indirect influence through the
Europarty—even if this influence is deemed insufficient,
as with the liberals and socialists. Only the Flemish na-
tionalists concluded that due to the dissonance with
most Europarties, the investment is not worth the yield.
They gladly sacrifice influence at the European level to
ensure their own coherence and independence, which
in turn necessitates greater internal investment.
However, functional goal-seeking is only part of the
explanation. Indeed, the strength of the partisan net-
work does not seem to be a reliable predictor of the
investment national parties make. Although the posi-
tive argument holds for the ‘traditional’ parties, both
the greens and the nationalists disprove it in a nega-
tive sense. Groen has no clear functional incentive to in-
vest in the EGP and yet it does, while it is far from clear
that the nationalists would make the investment even
if the ECR/EFA would become a more institutionalised
network. Rather, ideological considerations—a pro-EU
stance (Groen) and ideological congruence (N-VA)—
seem to drive their organisational choices. While the im-
mediate benefits a European partisan network can offer
thus certainly matter, they need to be considered in tan-
dem with less functionally oriented factors.
6. Conclusion
This article assessed the multilevel organisation of na-
tional political parties in an EU context. By describing
and explaining the way Flemish political parties are or-
ganised vis-à-vis the EU, it provides meaningful insights
into an at times neglected element of EU multilevel gov-
ernance. This conclusion addresses two issues. First, to
what extent does the proposed framework sufficiently
capture and explain parties’ choices for particular organ-
isational strategies? Second, what do the findings tell us
about multilevel democracy in the EU—do parties con-
sider the EU a genuine political level, or are we living
apart together?
This article builds on previous research that has
shown that, while there is little to no ‘control’ of na-
tional parties over their EU-level agents, there are in
fact significant amounts of contact between the domes-
tic and European levels (Hix, Farrell, Scully, Whitaker, &
Zapryanova, 2016; Jensen et al., 2013; Raunio, 2000;
Senninger & Bischof, 2017). Looking more closely at the
precise nature and structure of these contacts, the ar-
ticle presented a novel typology of multilevel party or-
ganisation in an EU context, based on the federal no-
tion of vertical integration. By separating the external
and internal dimensions of vertical integration, this ap-
proach allows for a holistic study of multilevel party or-
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ganisation outside of the national and into the supra-
national context—an aspect which has not received a
lot of scholarly attention so far. Moreover, this article
bridges different strands of literature by adopting a ratio-
nal choice institutionalist perspective to explain why par-
ties would opt for certain types of organisation. It argues
that parties are functional goal-seekers that choose their
organisation based on a cost-benefit analysis, involving
both party characteristics and the institutional context.
It was hypothesised that a party’s government participa-
tion and the Europarty of which it is a member would
explain its organisational choices.
Overall, Flemish parties are hesitant to invest a great
deal in their vertical integration vis-à-vis the EU level,
particularly on the internal dimension. The EU’s limited
electoral relevance seems to be the main reason for this.
Indeed, in the domestic arena the EU is little more than
a political issue that needs addressing when (and only
when) it is salient. The cost of investing in coordination
with those actors ‘outside’ the national arena, such as
parties’ EP delegation, is thus generally too great com-
pared to the possible gains made ‘inside’ that arena.
Drawing attention to the dominance of the domestic
vote-seeking behaviour of parties, this article supports
earlier accounts of the non-Europeanisation of politi-
cal parties (Ladrech, 2007; Poguntke et al., 2007) and
of party behaviour in multilevel democracies (Däubler,
Müller, & Stecker, 2018).
Still, although (short-term) interaction seems to fluc-
tuate with media attention, there is notable variation be-
tween Flemish parties in terms of their overall approach.
Internally, government participation is a reliable indica-
tor, as it largely determines the goal-seeking behaviour
of parties:While opposition parties aremostly interested
in gaining votes and winning elections, governing parties
are confronted more directly with policy expectations
and aremore acutely concerned about internal cohesion.
Still, the organisational traditions of a party also play an
important role, as the cases of CD&V and N-VA clearly
show. Externally, the strength of a European network can
in itself only somewhat explain the observed variation.
All parties recognise the functional advantages of being
part of a European network, but additional normative
concerns—such as the EU position of the party (Groen)
and congruence with the Europarty (N-VA)—play an im-
portant mediating role.
Both H1 and H2 can thus only partially be confirmed,
triggering the conclusion that the overall framework re-
quires more refinement. Particularly, the differences be-
tween the Flemish parties point out that functional goal-
seeking is not the only logic at play. Parties’ organisa-
tional traditions and normative considerations also play
an important role in their assessment of costs and bene-
fits. As such, to understand party organisation, the ratio-
nal choice institutionalist ‘logic of consequences’ needs
to be supplemented by the logics of appropriateness and
path dependency. Investing in vertical integration might
be considered the (in)appropriate thing to do, or be a
compelling consequence of past investments, regardless
of any concrete goal being achieved. While parties’ ra-
tionality is thus not fundamentally in question, the case
studies have shown that the cost-benefit analyses parties
conduct also take into account norms and traditions.
As for the state of European democracy, these find-
ings are not great news.Most Flemish parties largely sep-
arate their domestic and European activities, or confirm
the dominance of the former over the latter. The EU is
an issue that occasionally needs to be managed, but it
is not a genuine polity of which parties recognise the
political relevance (see also Braun, Hutter, & Kerscher,
2016). Yet, the meaningful translation of citizen prefer-
ences into EU decision-making requires intense cooper-
ation both internally and externally. As such, the limited
intra-party multilevel coordination significantly adds to
the democratic deficit of the EU. Moreover, this study
confirms the nation-state as the prime arena for public
debate and democratic legitimacy. Considering the cen-
tral role of parties therein, they have the responsibility
to choose between pro-actively extending their activi-
ties to the European level—effectively breaking out of
the nation-state—or to reconsider the democratic foun-
dations of the EU as a collective of national democracies.
So, what can we learn from the Flemish case? These
results simultaneously highlight the importance of EU
politicisation in the domestic arena, while showing that
norms and traditions can overrule functional impera-
tives. On the one hand, the variation between parties
has shown the limits of rational goal-seeking behaviour
as the chief explanation for parties’ (multilevel) organ-
isation. Parties, it would seem, have a wide range of
specific incentives why (not) to invest in coordination
with ‘Brussels.’ For example, as convincingly argued by
Euchner and Frech in this thematic issue, the relationship
between MEPs and national parties is highly complex
and essentially questions the concept of parties asmono-
lithic organisations (Euchner & Frech, 2020). Future re-
search will thus need to look beyond domestic contex-
tual factors, such as politicisation or proximity, and take
a closer look at party-level factors to explain variation.
Concurrently, the various incentives andmotivations par-
ties have to (not) invest in vertical integration, as well
as the interplay between them, need to be qualified in
more detail. Cross-country comparative research would
add significantly to our understanding of the topic.
On the other hand, the case study has shown that
politicisationmatters greatly when it comes tomultilevel
coordination, particularly with parties’ own EP delega-
tion. The lack of domestic electoral relevance of what
happens in the EP has led parties to maintain informal
ad hoc contacts with their MEPs, rather than to invest in
‘strong’ coordinative structures. Although Belgiummight
have an exceptionally low politicisation, it is not by far
the only country where the EU plays second fiddle. One
can thus expect to find this overall result in most other
EU member states: As long as the EU is not sufficiently
politicised in the domestic arena, national parties will
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have insufficient incentives to treat it as anything more
than an issue. Until then, it remains most likely that we
will be living apart together.
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